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Introduction
With his successful coup d'état on 25 July 1996, the former Burundian president Pierre Buyoya brought the ongoing regional meditation efforts to a standstill, an occurrence that marked the preliminary failure of Burundi's democratic transition process and pulled the country even deeper into the civil war. 1 The neighboring countries reacted swiftly and agreed to "exert maximum pressure on the regime in Bujumbura including the imposition of economic sanctions" (Second Regional Summit on the Burundi Conflict 1996). They demanded the imme-WP 255/2014
GIGA Working Papers diate restoration of Burundi's National Assembly and the reinstatement of political parties as well as peace negotiations. Simultaneously, the international donors froze all assistance other than emergency aid.
The subsequent unfolding of the sanctions episode against Burundi was characterized by two seemingly contradictory developments: On the one hand, the regime resisted the external coercion, to the surprise of the sanction senders, who, given Burundi's economic and geopolitical vulnerability, had expected to force Buyoya into negotiations. The sanctions' initial effect on Burundi was indeed harsh; they further paralyzed the already war-torn economy (Kamungi et al. 2005; Khadiagala 2003 ). This thus raises the question of how the Buyoya government managed to withstand the pressure of one of the most comprehensive sanction regimes since the end of the Cold War. In addition to sanction-busting activities, the regime launched a vocal campaign against the sanctions that 1) helped it to lobby for exemptions,
2) contributed to it regaining some international legitimacy so that the international donor community renewed its engagement, and
3) shifted the blame for economic problems to the embargo.
On the other hand, Buyoya eventually engaged in the kind of regionally mediated negotiations that he had previously rejected. According to the assessment of scholars and contemporary witnesses alike, the sanctions contributed significantly to reviving the peace process because of their severe economic consequences (Khadiagala 2003; Lemarchand 2001: 91; Maundi 2003; Ndikumana 2000; Interview, Leonidas Nijimberere; Interview, Frederic Bamvuginyumvira) . However, the fact that the regime agreed to the Arusha negotiations when the sanctions' economic impact had withered casts doubt on this interpretation. This paper argues that the controversies surrounding the embargo became so deeply ingrained in the domestic struggle that they shaped the domestic political contestation between the Buyoya government and the political opposition, beyond the embargo's mere economic impact. The Buyoya government became argumentatively "self-entrapped" in its own diplomatic campaign against the sanctions, which stressed the government's willingness to engage in peace talks.
This paradox underscores the need to go beyond the assessment of how sanctions coerce regimes into compliance (for example, see Hufbauer et al. 2007; McGillivray and Stam 2004; Morgan and Bapat 2003) and to seriously examine their signaling dimension (Giumelli 2011) .
Against the backdrop of the embargo's severe economic consequences, the sanctions against Burundi serve as a "critical case" (Flyvbjerg 2006: 230) rundi were used to supplement the analysis whenever they were available. 2 Although the sanctions were imposed on Burundi during the late 1990s, they still constitute an integral part of the country's (diverse) contemporary historical narrative(s) and were thus remembered by all interviewees in great detail. Moreover, former political elites who are no longer in office were able to speak more openly about past events than they could have done at the time the sanctions were in place (Vorrath 2012) .
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. First, it situates the unfolding of the sanctions against Burundi in the broader context of the country's democratization in the early 1990s and the subsequent civil war. Next, it explores how the Buyoya government responded to the embargo with an aggressive and fairly successful anti-sanctions campaign. Building upon this, the fourth section analyses how the regime's international and domestic campaign backfired. The conclusion then discusses the findings in light of past studies on the sanctions against Burundi and the current research on sanctions more generally.
Setting the Context
The struggle surrounding the sanctions against Burundi not only affected domestic politics 3 but was also shaped by long-standing internal and regional dynamics. From 1966 to 1993 Burundi was governed by three military regimes under the unitary party Union pour le Progrès national (UPRONA, Union for National Progress). The ruling elite, composed exclusively of the Tutsi ethnic minority, repressed its citizens to sustain its grip on power (Uvin 1999) . A series of violent outbreaks in 1965, 1972, and 1988 were characterized by similar patterns: Local-level (Hutu) rebel attacks were followed by retaliatory action from the Tutsi-dominated military forces (Bhavnani and Backer 2000; Ndikumana 2000; Sullivan 2005) 4 . In response to the violent retaliation against the Hutus in 1988, the international community forced then president Buyoya to pave the way for democracy (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2000; Curtis 2013) . A multiparty system was subsequently introduced in response to the growing international pressure (Laely 1997) .
After losing the 1993 elections, which were widely praised as free and fair, Buyoya accepted defeat and ceded power to Melchior Ndadaye, the candidate of the major opposition 2 Unfortunately, many documents such as the relevant editions of FRODEBU's party magazine l'Aube de la Dé-mocratie as well the releases by the UPRONA-affiliated press agency Net Press, which would be useful sources for reconstructing the discursive struggle about the embargo, were lost during the civil war.
3 In examining the domestic dynamics of contention in light of regional sanctions, this paper focuses on FRODEBU as the main political opposition to Buyoya rather than on the civil war with the rebel movements CNDD-FDD and PALIPEHUTU-FNL, as the regional sanctions played a particularly crucial role in the political struggle between FRODEBU and UPRONA/Buyoya. (Young 1996) . Although it made attempts at coalition and confidence building with the former ruling elite (Lemarchand 1994; Reyntjens 1993; Sullivan 2005) , the new government also initiated the "Frodebisation" of the civil service (Reyntjens 2000: 13) and promoted the redistribution of national resources (Reyntjens 1993: 579) as well as the return of Hutu refugees (Prunier 1994) , thereby creating anxiety among the Tutsi population. Moreover, the transition process was deeply flawed insofar that the former elite maintained its control over the army, which became an important veto player in domestic politics (Reyntjens 1993 (Ndikumana 2000) .
In reaction to this conflict and the accompanying threat to the region's stability, the presidents of Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania, and Zaire launched the Great Lakes Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi in November 1995 (henceforth, regional initiative). The former Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere was designated as mediator. At the same time, UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali proposed the deployment of a standby force of 25,000 soldiers in Burundi (Dupont 1997) ; however, this proposal was turned down on 5 March 1996 by the UN Security Council in Resolution 1049, which expressed preference for regionally led efforts for peace in the Great Lakes region (Neethling 2005) . In June and July 1996, the regional mediation cumulated in a series of summits, which advocated a negotiated settlement and national reconciliation but also considered instituting an arms embargo and visa bans for those undermining the peace process (Daley 2007) . The situation escalated when President Ntibantunganya, fearing a military takeover of power, fled to the US embassy (New York Times 1996a). On 25 July 1996, the army installed Buyoya, who had prevailed over former president Bagaza in an intra-ethnic power struggle, in a bloodless coup d'état (Nsanze 2003: 423) .
Only six days after the coup, the heads of state of Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, and Zambia as well as Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) met in Arusha. Using the framework of the regional initiative, these states strongly condemned the coup and imposed sanctions to achieve a return to constitutional order and "immediate and unconditional negotiations with all parties to the conflict" (Second Regional Summit on the Burundi Conflict 1996). Nyerere, who had already suggested sanctions against Burundi before the coup and felt that the military takeover had severely undermined his mediation efforts, forcefully articulated the pro-sanctions case (Wolpe 2011) . The regional leaders affirmed his approach as they feared a further spillover of the conflict, which had already led to an influx of Burundian refugees to the neighboring countries (Nimubona 2007: 505) . In addition, most heads of state had grown impatient with the former (Tutsi) elite's reliance on unconstitutional means to hold on to power (Wolpe 2011) . The region's response to the crisis in Burundi was coordinated by the regional initiative, but negotiations about the continuation of sanctions also took place at OAU summits (Hoskins et al. 1997 ). Moreover, a regional sanctions coordinating committee (RSCC) was established to monitor the sanctions' effects and humanitarian impact (ReliefWeb 1996) .
The international community supported the regional initiative. In line with preceding international endorsements of regional attempts to address the crisis in Burundi, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution on 30 August 1996 that expressed support for the regional peace endeavors but did not refer explicitly to the imposition of sanctions (UN Security
Council 1996). The United States refused to recognize the new government and suspended bilateral assistance (Lomasney and Halperin 1998) , and the EU likewise froze its financial support (Hufbauer et al. 2007) .
Responding to a Costly Embargo: Political and Economic Strategies
Burundi's geographic location, its close economic ties with those who implemented the embargo, and its dependency on bi-and multilateral aid magnified the sanctions' economic im- Sanction scholars have hypothesized that a targeted society only acquiesces to such severe harm caused by economic sanctions up to a certain threshold, above which it reacts with protest (Kerr and Gaisford 1994) . Accordingly, they have identified the economic pain inflicted upon the target as a key predictor of the effectiveness of sanctions (Hufbauer et al. 2007; Morgan et al. 2009 ). However, the sanctions' economic impact did not trigger large-5 The interviews were conducted in French. All quotes are translations by the author.
WP 255/2014 GIGA Working Papers scale protest against the Burundian government, as anticipated by the sanction senders and the domestic opposition (Interview, Joseph Ndayisaba). 6 Instead, the government embarked on a two-track strategy to secure its rule, denouncing the embargo as illegal and too painful for the population while simultaneously working on reducing the financial costs.
Campaign against Sanctions
The regime launched a campaign against the embargo that targeted both domestic constituencies and the international community; this campaign has been characterized as highly dynamic, aggressive, and fairly effective (Bunting et al. 1999) . The campaign against the sanctions addressed two major issues: First, the process of deciding and implementing the embargo was condemned as illegal according to international law because "only the United Nations can impose sanctions" (Interview, Cyprien Mbonimpa).
Using this reasoning, the Buyoya regime stressed that many Western countries did not really support the embargo. France in particular was depicted as being "openly hostile" towards the measures (Buyoya 2011: 146; Manirakiza 2007: 61-76) . According to this reading, the sanctions constituted an exclusively Tanzanian initiative, which allegedly pursued a secret agenda of weakening "the proud and ancient nation of Burundi" (Nyamoya 1997 ). Nyerere's disproportionate engagement for the FRODEBU and the perception that he was using the sanctions to bring Buyoya back not to the negotiations in general but specifically to his regional negotiation table in Arusha attracted major criticism (Daley 2007; Peterson 2006 By shifting the blame for the imposition of sanctions to Tanzania and to Nyerere's desire to punish the post-coup government for interrupting his mediation efforts, Buyoya made sure that his core constituencies -namely, the army and the urban Tutsi elite -blamed them rather than his own coup for the sanctions (Economist Intelligence Unit 1997).
In response, the regional initiative sought the Western governments' support to demonstrate the broad international approval of the embargo (ReliefWeb 1996; Second Regional Summit on the Burundi Conflict 1996). Likewise, FRODEBU activists and other proponents of the embargo stressed its genuinely regional nature (Interview, Jean-Marie Ngendahayo;
Interview, Frédéric Bamvuginyumvira; Interview, Benoit Ndorimana) and the fact that "the region could not have taken the decision [to impose sanctions] without the support of the United Nations" (Interview, Albert Mbonerane).
Second, the regime stressed the humanitarian impact of the sanctions. According to the government, the sanctions disproportionately hit the poor, leading to a "shortage of essential elements for the survival of the population, especially food and medicine" (Interview, Gré-goire Banyiyezako). The campaign also emphasized the embargo's impact on the broader population, stressing that "FRODEBU claimed to represent 80 percent, but these 80 percent were suffering from sanctions" (Interview, Sébastien Ntahuga). In line with this strategy, a state-controlled NGO, the Association for the Preservation of Peace in Burundi, filed a case before the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights denouncing the sanctions' lack of proportionality (Olinga 2005) . In addition, sanctions were made responsible for all economic and social difficulties in an attempt to divert attention away from the regimeʹs own mismanagement (Hoskins et al. 1997) ; the disastrous effects of the civil war and a military budget that absorbed about half of the government's revenues were ignored (Economist Intelligence Unit 1998).
The government campaign regarding the humanitarian impact of sanctions was echoed by NGOs and UN agencies. Despite exemptions for the import of humanitarian goods, the embargo complicated their work (Bruderlein 1998 ) and turned them into key players in the anti-sanctions campaign (Khadiagala 2003: 230) . In response to the growing concern about the humanitarian impact of sanctions, the RSCC created a list of humanitarian exemptions on 24 October 1996 that included food, bean seeds, water purification agents, blankets, plastic sheeting, jerry cans and buckets, cooking utensils, sanitary facilities, and mats "to cater for the 250,000 displaced persons in Burundi" (Regional Sanctions Coordination Committee 1996). On 16 April 1997, schooling materials, seeds, and medicine were added to the list (Hoskins et al. 1997 (Cornwell and de Beer 1999; Lemarchand 2001: 92) . By mid-1998, the UN, the EU, and the United States had all intensified their demands that the sanctions be reconsidered (Mthembu-Salter 1999).
Decreasing Economic Effect
In addition to officially granted exemptions, the increase in sanction-busting activity played Lastly, the regime managed to adapt to the economic constraints set by the embargo. The "café-carburant" (coffee for fuel) initiative was launched to secure the supply of petrol and the export of Burundi's most important source of foreign revenues. Moreover, a "solidarity fund" was created to generate alternative revenues for the regime's war efforts in the face of foreign exchange shortages (Buyoya 2011: 147) . The Central Bank also created a list of prioritized items to be pursued with the limited amount of foreign exchange available (Banque de la
République du Burundi 1996: 60). This list was later amended to include selected enterprises of national interest such as the fuel-trading Société Interpetrol (Bulletin Officiel du Burundi 1997b). Private banks were obligated to transfer all remaining foreign exchange to the Central
Bank (Banque de la République du Burundi 1996: 60). Finally, the serving of external debt was suspended in response to the growing budget deficit (Interview, Astère Girukwigomba).
Argumentative Self-Entrapment
When the sanctions against Burundi were initially implemented, the expectation was that,
given Burundiʹs economic and geopolitical vulnerability, the weight of the embargo would force the government to resume the type of unconditional negotiations envisaged by the regional mediators (Khadiagala 2007: 126-127) . Instead, Buyoya initially managed to consolidate his grip on power. Sanction-busting activities, austerity measures, and exemptions as well as the partial resumption of international (humanitarian) assistance reduced the economic pain caused by the sanctions, so that the economy slowly recovered. After the nation's GDP decreased sharply in 1996, something which was attributed to the civil war and the sanctions, it remained stagnant in 1997 and grew by 7.4 percent in the following year (Hoskins et al. 1997; Kamungi et al. 2005) . In a nutshell, economic development "improved notably as regards internal production and public finances. In particular, the secondary and tertiary sectors were characterized by a recovery and ... inflation decreased remarkably thanks to the regular provision of goods of primary necessity" (Banque de la République du Burundi 1998: X).
Nevertheless, the government eventually responded to the sanction senders' key demand: that it engage in unconditional, inclusive peace talks under the auspices of the regional WP 255/2014 GIGA Working Papers mediator. Most scholars agree that sanctions ultimately played a major role in pressuring the Buyoya government into the Arusha negotiations, attributing much of the sanctions' success to "mounting domestic frustration with deteriorating economic conditions" (Lemarchand 2001: 92; Ndikumana 2000: 435) . But why did the regime in Burundi accept inclusive negotiations when the sanctions' costs had already subsided? 9 Galtung (1967) highlighted the fact that sanctions are prone to being used as symbols in the discursive struggle for legitimacy. This signaling impact of sanctions has recently received revived attention (Crawford and Klotz 1999; Grebe 2010; Pedersen 2008 ). In the case of Burundi, the sanctions not only affected the regime economically but also signaled disapproval of the coup and thereby denied the new government legitimacy (Khadiagala 2007: 124; Lomasney and Halperin 1998) . The regional initiative referred to the new government as the "Buyoya regime" rather than talking about the Bu- Soir 1996) . Responding to this twin challenge of economic and political pressure, the Buyoya government initiated its diplomatic campaign, during which it became increasingly entrapped in its own strategy of denouncing the sanctions as undermining the regime's efforts to negotiate.
Theoretical Argument
Such an "argumentative self-entrapment" (Risse 1999: 531) may occur when states that are facing international criticism and demands to act in line with certain norms begin "talking the talk," meaning that they discursively comply with an internationally backed and promoted discourse of democratic governance. Governments confronted with international pressure as a result of norm-violating behavior initially tend to increase domestic repression and deny the validity of international claims while stressing national sovereignty regarding the issue to discourage international interference. When the pressure mounts, national governments adjust strategically to (re)gain access to foreign aid and secure their rule vis-à-vis domestic opposition movements -for example, by making limited concessions to those advocating better protection of human rights and democratic governance (Risse and Sikkink 1999: 10) . Tactical commitments to human rights and democracy initially appear to be a lowcost strategy for responding to criticism, especially "for repressive states that come under close scrutiny" (Hafner-Burton et al. 2008: 117) . Accordingly, many states exhibit a certain degree of norm-conforming behavior. For example, they may join human rights regimes or, 9 There can be no doubt that the remaining trade restrictions still limited the economy's room to maneuver. The joint impact of the embargo and the civil war had significantly reduced the country's foreign exchange reserves and distorted the balance of payment (Banque de la République du Burundi 1998). Nevertheless, the fact that the major donors increasingly indicated that they were willing to resume aid to Burundi whether sanctions were lifted or not (Brandstetter 2004: B374) suggests that the regime's willingness to negotiate cannot be attributed only to the sanctions' economic pressure. in the case of sanctions, they may respond to certain demands made by the senders -all in order to silence demands for real change (Hathaway 2002 ).
However, limited concessions have been found to trigger developments that ultimately induce the governments to offer changes in behavior from which they then find it hard to extricate themselves (Risse and Sikkink 1999) . A state that "faces (actual or potential) sanctions and suffers a process of 'shaming' in which norm-violating states are portrayed as 'pariah states'" (Muñoz 2009: 43) is increasingly forced to justify its behavior in front of international and domestic audiences. When norm-violating governments accept the norms rhetorically in order to decrease the international and domestic pressure on them, they embark upon a process in which they are measured against their rhetorical concessions at later stages of an ongoing dialogue. Instrumental commitments then backfire because domestic or international actors are able to hold them accountable, especially when the governments no longer deny the validity of the international demands per se, but rather claim that international actors misinterpret the domestic situation and hence engage in a public debate regarding the latters'
critiques. Superficial commitments may translate into profound concessions over time when initial reforms spark further demands for change (Goodman and Jinks 2008) , especially if such reforms are interpreted as a partial success by opposition groups, which strengthens them and motivates additional demands (McAdam 2010).
The Case of Burundi
In the case of Burundi, the regime's argumentative self-entrapment occurred in three phases.
In a first phase, the regime denied that its seizure of power could be characterized as a coup and hence argued that the sanctions lacked any well-founded reason. The toughness of the sanctions took Buyoya and his supporters, who had relied on Buyoya's international reputation for having paved the way to multiparty democracy, by surprise (Uvin 1999) . To justify the takeover of power, Buyoya's supporters argued that the fact that the previous presidentwhose government was described as paralyzed by infighting and dysfunctional (Lemarchand 2007) -had fled to the US embassy had created a power vacuum, which left the stumbling nation without political leadership in a deepening security crisis (Interview, Emile Mworoha). In such a situation, Buyoya assumed his responsibility as an experienced statesman in a "political change dictated by the events" (Interview, Pierre Buyoya) and was guided by "humanitarian motives" (Interview, Léonidas Nijimbere) while simultaneously averting a takeover by Bagaza and the more extremist elements in the Tutsi community. In short, during this "denial phase" the regime disputed that the takeover of power could be characterized as a coup d'état, which would have potentially justified a strong regional and international response (Risse 1999: 545) .
In contrast, FRODEBU stressed that the coup had overthrown a democratically elected In a second phase, the Buyoya government then turned to criticizing the sanctions for undermining the true intentions behind the coup -namely, to reestablish democracy and revive the peace process (Longman 1998: 20) . The regime responded to some of the senders' demands in order to be able to argue that the sanctions were no longer necessary. It reopened the National Assembly and lifted the ban on political parties before the first review of economic sanctions in Arusha in mid-October 1996 (Khadiagala 2007) , conscious of the senders' pressure (Mthembu-Salter 1999). Nonetheless, the political significance of these reinstated institutions remained extremely limited. Political parties were only allowed under the vague requirement that they "positively contribute to Burundi's development" (Economist Intelligence Unit 1997), which gave Buyoya the freedom to outlaw them as he pleased.
Moreover, the Assemblée Nationale lacked clearly defined legislative powers in the absence of the constitution, which had been suspended after the coup (Hoskins et al. 1997 ).
In addition to responding to the senders' demands to restore constitutional rule, the regime stressed its willingness to engage in negotiations (Buyoya 2011: 142-143) . According to this discourse, the prolonged sanctions had undermined the government's attempts to find an internal solution to the crisis and "handicapped the negotiations" (Interview, Astère Girukwigomba). The government engaged in secret talks with the rebel movement CNDD with the mediation of the Italian Catholic organization Community of Sant'Egidio in Rome at the end of 1996 (Dupont 1997; Wolpe 2011) . To prove the regime's preparedness to advance a negotiated settlement of the conflict with the regional stakeholders, the government leaked information about these talks and circulated the agenda, which included the restoration of the constitutional order, a ceasefire, and the involvement of other political parties in the process (Nijimbere 2001; Interview, Pierre Buyoya) . The talks subsequently collapsed due to pressure from the Tutsi elites on the regime after the information had been leaked.
Meanwhile, the former ruling party and the major opposition party after the coup in Bu- 21 February 1998, however, the regional initiative stated that "no significant progress" had been achieved towards negotiating a solution to the conflict. It requested inclusive and unconditional negotiations including all rebel movements and political parties under the mediation of Nyerere, and threatened to uphold the embargo otherwise (IRIN 1998). Having repeatedly stressed that negotiations to produce a satisfactory outcome for both Hutus and Tutsis were its key intention (Dagne 1998) , the Buyoya administration had increasing difficulty justifying its reluctance to engage in the revitalization of the Arusha negotiations. By mid-1998 most parties to the conflict -namely, 17 political parties and rebel movements 11 -embarked on the Arusha process, with the first round of negotiations taking place from 15 to 21 June. The process strove to find a solution to the civil war and to lay the foundation for a transitional government that would incorporate representatives of all the principal factions (Lemarchand 2007) .
In January 1999 the remaining trade restrictions were finally lifted because the Burundi government had proved its irrevocable commitment to negotiations (Bentley and Southall 2005) .
Conclusion
The regional embargo in combination with the Western countries' decision to freeze development assistance initially hit the small, land-locked Burundi harshly. However, this financial pain only led to limited cooperation on the part of the sanctioned regime. It responded to the demands to reopen the National Assembly and relegalize political parties, but it only endowed these bodies with a very restricted mandate. In the meantime, the Buyoya government consolidated its grip on power. Economically, earnings from black market activities and the potential benefits of sanction-busting activities were used to cater to patronage networks. Politically, a successful campaign against the sanctions helped the regime to regain some recognition among core domestic supporters and the international community. However, this diplomatic campaign eventually backfired. The Buyoya government denounced the sanctions as undermining its negotiation efforts. As he became entrapped within this strategy of emphasizing the regime's willingness to engage in peace talks, Buyoya faced increasing difficulty in justifying why he would not agree to the kind of universal negotiations that the regional peace initiative was aiming for. While the regime managed to address the economic constraints posed by the sanctions through adaptation, lobbying for (humanitarian) exemptions, and sanction-busting to a considerable extent, its campaign to fight off challenges to its legitimacy -amplified by the sanctions -and to reengage important donors ultimately failed.
The embargo against Burundi hence sheds light not only on how targeted regimes manage to withstand pressure from sanctions in the short run, but also on how campaigns against sanctions -while initially helping the regime to sustain its power -can force targeted regimes to grant major political concessions if they start "talking the talk" of sanction senders.
11 The Arusha negotiations were seriously handicapped because they excluded the major armed adversaries of the regime, CNDD-FDD and PALIPEHUTU-FNL. This should not suggest that the regime's argumentative self-entrapment in its campaign against sanctions is sufficient to explain the embargo's effectiveness. Clearly, the Arusha process also built upon preceding negotiations (Maundi 2003) . Moreover, the conflict parties' war weariness and a mutually painful stalemate (Cunningham 2011: 178) contributed to the major political initiative that occurred in mid-1998, even though the fact that neither side was near victory had already been established in 1996 (Economist Intelligence Unit 1996) without prompting successful negotiations. In addition, internal divisions within both the Hutu and Tutsi camps had complicated the peace process. As Buyoya faced intraparty resistance to negotiating with FRODEBU from the military wing of UPRONA, he was only willing to further engage in the peace process once he had established himself domestically against this militant wing (Wolpe 2011) . While negotiations might have occurred one way or the other, the sanctions forced the government to negotiate with more openness and according to the conditions set by the regional initiative (Interview, Donatien Bihute).
Going beyond the case of Burundi, this paper shows how the signals sent by sanctions that delegitimize the targeted regime may become so deeply ingrained in domestic controversies that they profoundly affect political struggles. In such cases, whether sanctions enable domestic opposition to the sanctioned regime is a crucial question that merits further research (Wallensteen 2000) . In Burundi, the former ruling party and main opposition party after the coup, FRODEBU, continuously referred to the sanctions, which served as a reminder of the coup regime's irregular nature, in order to uphold pressure on the regime. The embargo played such a key aspect in this strategy that FRODEBU launched a pro-sanctions campaign (Interview Jean-Marie Ngendahayo).
The predominant focus on the financial impact of sanctions (for example, see Hufbauer et al. 2007; Jing et al. 2003; Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1999; Kaempfer et al. 2004 ) has obscured the possibility that a state "may initiate sanctions not simply to compel action on the part of the target, but to communicate its preference, support allies, deter others from engaging in similar activity, and dissuade the target from expanding its objectionable activity" (Kirshner 1997: 34) . Thus, sanctions not only coerce regimes into compliance or constrain them, but also send signals (Giumelli 2010 (Giumelli , 2011 ) that profoundly affect domestic political struggles, particularly how the regime in power and its opponents position themselves vis-à-vis each other and the external coercion.
